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This paper investigates the reasons why provincial issuing banks in Spain
maintained high reserves in the 19th century and the effects this had. The
introduction of banknotes into the economy meant that convertibility had to
be guaranteed. If convertibility was respected, this gave banks a good repu-
tation and made them reliable. The Palmer Rule was a control mechanism
stating that a well-managed bank should keep one-third of its liabilities as
cash in hand and two-thirds in securities. In Spain the banking system,
constituted in the mid-19th century, was characterised by a plurality of
issuing banks. Regulations required reserves only to secure notes, with no
mention of reserve requirements for banks’ other types of liabilities. How-
ever, Spanish provincial banks of issue adopted the Palmer Rule. The Bank
of Spain did not follow the same path.
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RESUMEN
Este trabajo investiga las razones y los efectos que tuvo el que los bancos
de emisión provinciales en España mantuvieran elevadas reservas en el siglo
XIX. La inserción de los billetes de banco en la economía requirió garantizar
la convertibilidad. Si se respetaba la convertibilidad, esto daba a los bancos
buena reputación y los hacía confiables. La Palmer Rule era una norma de
control que establecía que un banco bien administrado debería mantener en
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su caja en metálico un tercio de sus responsabilidades. En España el sistema
bancario se conformó a mediados del siglo XIX en base a un sistema plural
de emisión, sin competencia entre los diferentes billetes circulantes. La
regulación requería reservas para garantizar los billetes, sin contemplar
garantía alguna para el resto de pasivos bancarios. Pero los bancos emisores
provinciales adoptaron la Palmer Rule; no sucedió lo mismo con la senda
seguida por el Banco de España.
Palabras clave: Regla de Palmer, reputación bancaria, convertibilidad,
España
1. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of paper money as a monetary instrument was a long
process that took place throughout the 19th century and was consolidated in
the early 20th century. The banknote was the main innovation of this period
and its role in the economy was closely linked to the development of banks of
issue. The convertibility of notes into metal was a legal requirement that
enabled this innovation to spread. The convertibility guarantee of a new type
of currency was clearly linked to the reputation of the issuer and the reg-
ulatory framework that allowed it to circulate. The objective of this article is
to analyse the causes and the effects of Spain’s metallic reserve-holding
requirements and practices on the acceptance of banknotes and the expan-
sion of deposits— that is to say, on the development of an economy based on
non-metallic money.
The importance of reputation in business, to alleviate problems of
asymmetric information and the lack of legal and contract enforcement, is
especially decisive in the banking sector. Current analyses emphasise that
«the reliability and financial strength dimension is present in most general
and specific models, and it makes reference to the abilities that firms have to
generate benefits in order (…) to guarantee customers’ deposits in the case of
banks» (Ruiz et al. 2014, p. 264). This financial strength is an identifiable key
factor in banking reputation in times of crisis. Recent works support the
relevance of financial reputation to determine bank access to debt markets
(Camba-Mendez et al. 2014). Diamond’s analysis of reputation formation in
the credit markets (Diamond 1983) established that the monitoring of firms
was the initial stage through which one passes to obtain a good reputation
when the moral hazard is widespread. From a historical perspective, the
works of Gorton (1996) and Knodell (2010) are concerned with linking the
available information about the initial banknotes in the United States, and
the appearance of monitoring mechanisms that made them credible. Spe-
cifically, Gorton, following Diamond, points out that «redemptions serve the
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purpose of monitoring the new Banks» (Gorton 1996, p. 361). In the early
banking experiences of the 19th century, a factor linked to the reputation of a
banking institution was its solvency. Some bank managers emphasised the
strength of their cash as a measure of the strength of their balance sheet. This
strength would guarantee, in case of a crisis, the bank’s capacity to redeem
its notes. The issue banks of the mid-19th century provided disaggregated
information on their balance sheets in order to inform agents and, possibly,
to guide them on the control of the bank’s management (Bernal Lloréns and
Sánchez Ballesta 2008).
More recent works explore the role of reputation as a substitute
mechanism against the weakness or inefficiency of state regulation (Allen
et al. 2005). In Spain, the Bank of Spain originated as a bank linked to the
state’s needs, the Bank of San Carlos, which appeared at the end of the 18th
century. In the central decades of 19th century, twenty provincial issuing
banks appeared linked to industry and commerce. The multiplicity of banks
of issue until 1874, when the Bank of Spain monopolised the issue of money,
allowed notes to be found throughout the country. The banking regulation
that gave birth to these banks was inspired by European rules (especially
British and French). In addition to official regulation, the provincial banks
introduced a rule which was known among European banks. This rule was
inspired by the Palmer Rule, which owes its name to John Horsley Palmer,
Governor of the Bank of England between 1830 and 1833. The follow-up to
this rule involved «to invest and retain in securities, bearing interest, a given
proportion of the deposits, and the value received for the notes in circulation,
the remainder being held in coin and bullion; the proportions which seem to
be desirable, under existing circumstances, may be stated at about two-thirds
in securities and one-third in bullion»1. That is, Palmer’s rule required
keeping one-third of the bank’s liabilities (notes and deposits) in cash. This
rule has the peculiarity that it had been assumed by the banking system in
general but was not formally part of the banking regulation of the time. J. H.
Palmer acknowledged that experience was behind the adoption of this
reserve rule in the Bank of England.
The importance of the adoption of the Palmer Rule, in a period of
extension of a new type of currency, is related to the need to establish trust in
paper money. The Bank of England’s experience over more than a century
was not comparable to that of the banks that emerged between the late 18th
and mid-19th centuries throughout the world. Some of these early banks,
although private, were born linked to the needs of the states, which somehow
sustained them in times of difficulty. However, the new issuing and com-
mercial banks had to rely on the reputation of their directors and operations
to offer guarantees to their clients on the reliability of their notes (their
ability to be redeemed at sight).
1 Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Bank of England Charter, 1932, pp. 7-70.
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The origins of banks’ convertibility rules (formal and informal) are to be
found in the episodes of suspension of convertibility experienced in England
from 1797 until 1821, when the «full redemption of specie payments» (Fetter
1965, p. 96) was adopted again. England had de facto adopted the gold
standard at the end of the 17th century (in 1816 the demonetisation of silver
occurred, although it is not possible to identify a definite gold standard until
the regulation of 1821; Fetter 1965, p. 64), while most other countries
maintained a bimetallic system (Flandreau 1995, pp. 25–26). From the 1870s
most European countries adopted the gold standard. Spain, however, was
not among them2. The starting point of this article is an analysis of the norms
of convertibility adopted by the incipient Spanish banking system during the
so-called period of «plurality of emission». This plurality is not the same as
free banking, since free banking grants the freedom to create banks and the
non-existence of privileges; this was not the case in Spain.
This paper examines the introduction of the Palmer Rule into Spanish
banking legislation and the degree to which Spanish banks of issue respected
this rule. The article covers the period from the creation of the Bank of San
Fernando (later re-named The Bank of Spain) in 1829, until the law of 1921
which initiated the process by which the Bank of Spain became the Central
Bank. Initially, deposits played a relatively insignificant role in provincial
banks’ passive liabilities, while current accounts played a larger role. The
latter were regarded as a service provided by institutions to enable customers
to collect or make payments, and for which they paid a fee3. Until the pro-
mulgation of the 1885 Commercial Code, Spanish banking regulations
obviated the reserve requirements of deposits and current accounts and
demanded only that banks guarantee notes in circulation. However, while
provincial banks incorporated reserve requirements for the convertibility of
all instruments, the bank associated with the state did not. This means that
early provincial banks applied the Palmer Rule, guaranteeing their liabilities,
while the Bank of Spain constantly broke this rule.
Was the application of the Palmer Rule by the issuing banks a Spanish
peculiarity? International literature considers that this rule was linked to the
banks that worked with their governments. In Spain this had a particular
application: regulation did not reflect the reserve requirements necessary to
cover sight deposits, however the provincial banks followed the requirement
2 A recent working paper by Martínez-Ruíz and Nogués-Marco (2018) points out the respon-
sibility of the Bank of Spain to defend gold adherence.
3 This is a key aspect, for at least legally, these funds could not be loaned out initially. The royal
decree that in 1829 acknowledged the creation of the Spanish Bank of San Fernando stated that
current accounts paid the bank for its services (art. 28). Blasco-Martel and Sudrià (2010, p. 97)
explain that, initially, the Bank of Barcelona charged for cheque books. Officially, voluntary deposits
were not remunerated, and indeed, they initially carried a fee. Pastor Rodríguez pointed out in the
mid-1800s that «the few Banks that have existed and exist have paid no interest on the amounts that
they have received from current accounts» (1850, p. 22).
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of keeping in cash a third of both notes and deposits. The Bank of Spain did
not. The explanation for this behaviour can be found in that the Bank of Spain,
despite being a private bank, maintained a strong link with the state. This link
was certainly contradictory because it was a private bank that had to respond
to the interests of its shareholders but, at the same time, it had a commitment
to the Treasury. Pablo Martin Aceña rightly defines this relationship: «The
Treasury needed a financial agent for its own survival», but simultaneously, «it
was the State’s financial needs that helped to keep the institution (Bank of
Spain) alive» (Martín-Aceña 2017, p. 21). The relationship between the state
and the Bank of Spain was one of mutual dependency. The Bank of Spain
understood that its obligations were to finance the government and act as
issuer of banknotes, and it tried to maintain its autonomy throughout the
period. It did not feel involved with financing the economy and, in fact, «It was
a kind of (financial) State within the State» (Martín-Aceña 2017, p. 32). On the
other hand, the provincial banks, which had the exclusive privilege of issuing
paper money in their territories, maintained a proximity to the local business
world and had to build their reputation in order to circulate their banknotes.
Undoubtedly, the way in which banknotes were introduced had much to do
with its subsequent extension to the whole country, when in the 1880s the
Bank of Spain issued just one note for the whole country.
The first part of this article describes the relationship established in
England between notes and deposits briefly, and the application of the Pal-
mer Rule in that country. It then turns to look at the regulations established
by Spain’s banks of issue regarding the emission of notes. We then analyse
the application of the Palmer Rule by banks of issue, as well as the Bank of
Spain’s inability and/or unwillingness to apply it. Finally, we examine the
regulation of notes and convertibility until the Act of 1921. A brief conclusion
closes the article.
2. BANKNOTES, DEPOSITS AND THE PALMER RULE
The incorporation of banknotes into the English economy generated a
debate between those who favoured this new financial instrument, and those
who opposed it; the debate centred on the characteristics, functions and
effects of notes, and addressed their monetary or credit character. At the end
of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries, Adam Smith’s ideas on
banknotes as representing gold and silver in a country’s internal operations,
and their relationship with negotiable instruments, were commonly accep-
ted. However, some ambiguities surrounding the concept of real bills set
forth by this Scottish philosopher had generated discrepancies4. The real
4 On the ambiguities and paternity of the real bills doctrine, see Perlman (1989), who argues
that Adam Smith did not develop the real bills doctrine, which in fact contradicts his propositions,
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bills doctrine held that the expansion of the monetary supply should only
take place in response to the necessities of commerce (Humphrey 1982,
pp. 3–4). Henry Thornton believed that banknotes substituted bills of
exchange rather than bullion, and that they were similarly based on trust5.
This discussion formed the very origin of the division between bullionists
(who essentially upheld the ideas proposed by the quantitative theory of
money, and declared themselves supporters of a convertible metallic stan-
dard, thus anchoring the monetary supply to bullion) and anti-bullionists
(who appealed to the real bills doctrine and argued that the emission of
paper money should be linked to the demand for credit). Eventually, these
two positions led to the development of two separate monetary doctrines,
ongoing throughout the 19th century: the Currency School and the Banking
School. Both intellectual currents argued about the regulation and control of
monetary instruments, defending positions that were crystallised in England
in the 1844 Peel Banking Act (Poitras 1998, p. 379). If in 1844 the Currency
School triumphed, by the end of the 19th century, the Banking School had
won more followers.
The use of banknotes was widespread in England thanks to the combi-
nation of a dynamic credit market and the proliferation of financial inter-
mediaries. The economic surplus produced by agriculture generated deposits
that were used to finance industry and commerce. These activities required a
diverse set of agents: brokers, country banks, and the London City bankers
and banks, including the Bank of England. Rural savings were thus invested
in profitable projects that provided liquidity to industry and commerce, and
savers were adequately remunerated. After the suspension of convertibility in
1797, the need for a means of payment encouraged the expansion of country
banks notes. The return of convertibility in 1821 and the 1825 crisis forced
the Bank of England to take responsibility for drawing up a ratio between
reserves and liabilities (Clapham 1944, p. 124–125). This assumption of
responsibility led to the so-called Palmer Rule, which guaranteed the con-
vertibility of issued notes while it limited the credit that banks could provide
(King 1936, pp. 38, 72–79).
The characteristics of the English banking system are not comparable
with those of other European banking systems. The Bank of England, despite
its private nature, acted as a pivot for the whole British banking system
(Fetter 1965, pp.152–155, 258–259). The regulation of 1826 prohibited the
creation of issuing banks fewer than sixty-five miles from London, thus
favouring the expansion of Bank of England notes. This was not the case in
France until the 1840s, or in Spain, where the Bank of Spain’s banknotes did
(footnote continued)
and that the doctrine’s true author is James Mill. A synthesis of this debate can be found in Gherity
(1994).
5 The real bills doctrine was amply discussed early on by H. Thornton (1802) and D. Ricardo
(associated with the Currency School), and was later rehabilitated by the Banking School.
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not have truly national circulation until the 1880s. The differences between
the Bank of Spain and that of England had already been identified by
Santillán, governor of the Bank of Spain in the mid-19th century. Among
them, he pointed out that although the Bank of England performed the
functions of a government cashier and was not paid for it, a margin of
23 days was reserved to use public revenues before paying them to the
Treasury. On the other hand, the Bank of England received the deposits of an
official nature, which in Spain was done by the Caja General de Depósitos. In
addition, Bank of England notes were considered legal currency throughout
the nation, which was not the case in Spain (Tedde de Lorca 2015, p. 160).
Banking in Spain originated almost exclusively as a handmaiden of the
state, to satisfy its needs (Tortella Casares and García Ruiz 2013, p. 17).
Banknotes had a very limited circulation until the mid-19th century, and
Spanish banks did not habitually pay interest on term deposits or current
accounts (Blasco-Martel 2016, pp. 89–94). Note convertibility was regulated
late as well as loosely. Late, because it was not formally expressed until the
proliferation of provincial banks; and loosely, because violating the norms
bore no consequences. The Spanish credit market was tied to trade, and
although by the mid-19th century industry was also a part of that, the
countryside and its financial needs were not. At the end of the 18th century,
agrarian credit operated through a series of instruments adapted to a rural
world characterised by the scarcity of capital (Peña-Mir 2016).
Spain’s primary banking and issuing experience materialised in 1772 in
the Bank of San Carlos, founded by King Carlos III, according to a project
submitted by the French financier Francisco Cabarrús (Santillán 1865; Tedde
de Lorca 1988). In 1829, the Bank of San Carlos was transformed into the
Spanish Bank of San Fernando, and from 1844 onwards, there was a slow
growth of banking institutions, with the appearance of the Bank of Isabel II
and the Banks of Barcelona and Cádiz6. The 1856 laws that regulated banks
of issue and credit societies, encouraged the opening of banks of issue all
over the peninsula, and between 1856 and 1864, eighteen banks of issue were
created (Sudrià i Triay and Blasco-Martel 2016). During this period, «the so-
called ‘metallist’ school clearly held sway over the ‘nominalist’ school, which
meant that the public, as well as the authorities, entertained the conviction
that it was necessary and desirable to maintain a strong currency with a large
specie content» (Martín-Aceña 2000, p. 114).
The spread of banknotes in monetary circulation, and the proliferation of
banks that created money from deposits, raised a set of problems associated
with the effect of monetary variables on the real economy. In a metallic
6 The Spanish Bank of San Fernando was renamed the Bank of Spain in 1856. In this article,
these names are used indiscriminately. On the Bank of Isabel II, see Zumalacárregui (1952) and
Tedde de Lorca (1995). On the Spanish Bank of San Fernando, see Santillán (1865) and Tedde de
Lorca (1999). On the Bank of Barcelona, see Blasco-Martel and Sudrià (2010), and on the Bank of
Cádiz, see Torrejón Chaves and Higueras Rodicio (2016).
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system, one of the turning points was in the relationship that existed between
these financial innovations and the metallic reserves. The National Bank of
Belgium expressed the Palmer Rule thus in their statutes: «The statutes only
required that the NBB’s metal stock had to represent at least one-third of its
demand liabilities– the total value of banknotes in circulation plus the NBB’s
current account deposits» (Buyst and Maes 2008, p. 161). In France, in the
middle of the 19th century, there was also analysis of the stock of metal
necessary to ensure the convertibility of banknotes. On the one hand,
experience had shown it was sufficient to keep one-third in cash (d’Eichthal
1864, p. 183); but on the other, it was clear that in boom times keeping a
third of circulation as specie meant that resources were underutilised, while
in times of crisis, this same amount was not considered sufficient (Legrand
1879, pp. 4–6). The Bank of Portugal, which maintained convertibility to gold
between 1854 and 1891, incorporated the Palmer Rule for the first time
(metallic reserve requirements of one-third notes and deposits) in 1888 (Reis
2007, p. 720).
Throughout the 19th century bank deposits were also extended and so,
therefore, was the ability of banks to create money through loans. The Bank
of France, at the general meeting of shareholders in 1850, pointed out that
current accounts formed part of the demandable liability, such as notes:
« Peut-être n’a-t-on pas assez généralement compris que les rapports
entre l’Actif disponible et le Passif exigible ne variaient point dans la
proportion de la hausse des Encaisses comparée au montant de la
Circulation, car les Comptes-courants remboursables sur demande
font partie du Passif exigible, aussi bien que les Billets en émission; or,
ces Comptes-courants haussent toujours en même temps que les
Encaisses »7.
The Bank of France maintained very high reserves throughout the second
half of the 19th century. Thus, their metallic reserves regularly exceeded even
the requirements of the Palmer Rule8.
The expansion of issuing banks in Europe occurred between the end of
the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries (Sudrià 2016, p. 45). Issuing
banks obtained their resources by three means: the capital disbursed by
stockholders, the notes issued by such institutions, and the funds deposited
in current accounts. Issue of banknotes constituted the best introduction for
a system of bank deposits, for it was easier to convince a person to accept a
note, than to have them place their deposits in a banker’s custody (Bagehot
1999). Notes were convertible at sight and to the bearer, which meant that
they had to have very liquid guarantees. In the mid-19th century, French
7 Assemblée Générale des Actionnaires de la Banque de France du 31 Janvier 1850.
8 Assemblée Générale des Actionnaires de la Banque de France (1850-1914).
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banker A. d’Eichthal suggested that an issuing bank’s resources should follow
this path: the capital entrusted by the public in exchange for the banknotes
should be guaranteed, whether as metallic reserves available to its custo-
mers, or as state funds (he proposed that a share of public debt should
represent half the notes); the capital that its customers placed in their current
accounts should be applied to credit and discount operations (since its
customers were mostly traders and merchants who used the bank as a safety
deposit box); and finally, shared capital, which guaranteed its notes and its
current account creditors, could be split between the two preceding cate-
gories, or placed in one, depending on circumstances (d’Eichthal 1864).
The aforementioned scheme was implicit in England’s Bank Charter Act
1844, passed under the government of Robert Peel. The Act distinguished
between notes that were guaranteed by government debt that actually
represented gold, and banking operations that substituted bills of exchange
and involved credit. The Bank of England’s division into two departments —
the issuing department and the banking department — separated the
monetary function of notes from their credit function. The issue of notes was
fixed and guaranteed by public debt, so that any new notes had to be backed
by gold, and only the Bank of England could issue new banknotes.
There was less agreement on the requirement for a guarantee on sight
deposit than there was on notes. Robert Torrens had criticised the Bank of
England in 1833 for permitting its issues to fluctuate without reference to its
specie holdings, and he had also criticised the Palmer Rule for including
deposits (Fetter 1965, p. 167). Other authors pointed out that the credit
function would be realised only through bank deposits, because the condi-
tion of holding a portion of banknotes and deposits in cash could depress
fiduciary circulation (Wolowski 1864, p. 399). Halfway through the 19th
century, the role of deposits and, therefore, the function that banks could
perform as creators of money was still debated. Proof of this is found in the
answer that Lord Overstone gave R. Torrens in an 1857 letter:
«Deposits are absolutely nothing –a mere right - a book debt - nothing
more - they have neither intrinsic value, nor are they by custom or law
the medium of universal exchange. Paper notes, or banknotes, are
merely substitutes for the metallic money – resorted to on account of
mechanical convenience and economy in use. Unless they are strictly
the representatives of and substitutes for, the metallic coin – they are
not true money - they are false and spurious pretenders» (O’Brien
1971, p. 714).
It is worth considering how all this controversy over banknotes and
deposits was reflected in the operations of the Bank of England.
As can be seen in Figure 1 the amount of specie exceeded the require-
ments of the Palmer Rule in 1821. From 1825 until 1844, it is noted that,
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despite the fluctuations, most of the time the liabilities of the Bank of
England were not covered by the requirements of the Palmer Rule. The time
periods during which the cash resources were below the Palmer Rule
approximate the periods when the Bank suspended the 1844 law (1847, 1857
and 1866; King 1936, p. 237). During the other periods, the Bank of England
respected the Palmer Rule. This Figure does not correspond with the state-
ment that «the Bank found that, partly because of a series of special
circumstances, it was unable to operate the rule anyway» (O’Brien 2004,
p. 183). Thus, the convertibility of notes is associated with compliance with
this rule (even if such rule was not formally incorporated).
3. REPUTATION AND ISSUING BANKS IN SPAIN
Until the law of 1921, the banking laws in Spain had been primarily
focussed on regulating emission. Despite this, the money supply grew faster
FIGURE 1
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Source: The Bank of England’s Annual Balance Sheet 1696–2014 (pounds): https://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/research-datasets#
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than GDP: in 1850 M2 represented barely 15 per cent of GDP, whereas in
1920 it surpassed 30 per cent9. Spanish issuing banks regulated their issue of
banknotes using a twofold principle. Issuing was related partly to capital and
partly to the amount of metallic reserves necessary to guarantee the convert-
ibility of notes. Founded with state intervention and inextricably linked to
government economic activity, the earliest banks — the Bank of San Carlos,
and eventually, the Bank of San Fernando (which would become the Bank of
Spain) — did not follow this system. From the end of the 18th century, the
Bank of San Carlos issued paper money through vales reales (royal bonds),
which were «admissible at par and generated interest for all sorts of con-
tributions, and were legal tender for all kinds of transactions, except for the
payment of wages and retail trade» (White 1987, p. 511). Royal vouchers did
not meet the requirements necessary to make them true banknotes; they were
more a type of debt security put into circulation. The Bank of San Carlos,
however, was also authorised to print notes, referred to as cédulas, and these
were put into circulation for the first time in 1783, with a second issue taking
place in 1797, although they both met with little success10.
The capacity to issue notes payable at sight and to the bearer, was granted
to the Spanish Bank of San Fernando through the royal decree of 9 July
1829. This decree explicitly stated that the notes’ bearers should be paid
immediately and fully (without deductions). The law said nothing about
limiting emission, leaving this matter to the discretion of the bank’s gov-
erning board. Despite its relationship with the state, San Fernando was a
private bank and the board was composed of businessmen and one state
representative. San Fernando’s banknotes were issued in Madrid, and
although it did not open branches until after the 1856 law, its notes circu-
lated in the provinces through its agent banks.
The Spanish Bank of San Fernando only admitted into its current
accounts money or payables in Madrid. The funds available to current
account holders were those that had already been made effective, since the
bank did not advance cash, and dispensing payments or payment orders with
non-existent funds was penalised (banks did not allow overdrafts). On the
other hand, clients had to give ten days’ notice if payable obligations were
contracted with the bank. This 10-day notice period was a requirement
unique to the Madrid bank, for provincial banks required a much briefer
period, and it suggests that the Bank of San Fernando used the funds that it
acquired through its current accounts for financial intermediation, and that
this was part of the operative logic with which it was founded11. In fact, it
9 Data from Martín-Aceña and Pons Brías (2005) and Prados de la Escosura (2003).
10 See Tortella Casares (2008, p. 333), Fernández Marugan and Schwartz (1978, p. 423) and
Tortella Casares (1997, p. 91-96). According to the essay written by Fernández Marugan and
Schwartz (1978, pp.425-434), the paper money issued by the Bank of San Carlos did not adequately
address the matter of convertibility.
11 Real Cédula 9 de Julio de 1829 and Reglamentos of 1832 (Bank of San Fernando).
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was considered that the crisis the Bank went through in 1847 was due to the
fact that it had generated alarm and distrust among the population because
the bank had used deposits12. During that time and until the mid-19th cen-
tury, current accounts were considered a service provided by financial
institutions to their customers, allowing them to collect or make payments
more easily. However, the management of current accounts demanded a
greater dedication from banking institutions than the management of
banknotes. Voluntary deposits were free and Spanish coins, foreign currency
in the shape of bullion, ingots, jewellery and government bonds, were all
accepted. In general, the role of deposits in Spanish banking before 1874 lent
itself to confusion, especially because term deposits were scarce (which
makes sense, given that they did not attract interest13), and safety deposit
boxes abounded, which appeared to make the banks’ function that of mere
custodian.
The regulatory system of Spanish provincial banks was based on those
that governed the Bank of San Fernando. In 1844, the Bank of Isabel II in
Madrid and the Bank of Barcelona were permitted to carry out credit
operations in these cities. Legal limits were imposed on these banks’ capacity
to issue notes in relation to their capital. In the case of the Bank of
Barcelona, it was required to keep a given percentage of metallic reserves to
guarantee its notes. The Bank of Isabel II’s maximum volume of emission of
«cédulas al portador» (writs to the bearer) was limited to twice its paid-in
capital (Statutes art. 6). However, shortly afterwards — in 1847 — this bank
ceased to exist. The Bank of Barcelona could initially issue notes that
equalled the total of its nominal capital, of which only one part was dis-
bursed. The novelty introduced by this bank was that it included in its
regulations a requirement for convertibility. Article 10 of its charter
demanded that the bank keep a third of its issued notes in metallic reserves.
Despite the fact that this was part of its official statutes, the directors of the
Bank of Barcelona pointed out that «one of its obligations, which the
Governing Board imposed on itself voluntarily, was to keep in its vault the
third of its liabilities at sight »14. This was the first time that the application
of the Palmer Rule was mentioned in Spain, and it was indeed voluntary, for
the bank’s charter did not demand that the totality of the bank’s liabilities be
guaranteed.
12 See the brochure of Pablo Avecilla (1847, p. 15).
13 Martínez Méndez wrote: «The Bank (of Spain) always maintained a policy of non-
remuneration of its liabilities in the form of deposits, for reasons that are not entirely clear,
although presumably it was confident that its relative solvency was a powerful motive for attracting
deposits» (2005, cap.15, p. 16). In a report about «Relations with the Bank of Spain» in 1927
(interviews with Bernis) it wrote that «no interest is paid by the Bank» in current accounts and cash
deposits. See Bank of England Archive, file OV61/25.
14 Minutes of the General Meeting of Shareholders of the Bank of Barcelona. 1 August 1847.
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The case of the Bank of Barcelona illustrates both the initial difficulties in
establishing new monetary instruments, and the importance of building a
reputation. In relation to the introduction of new financial instruments, it is
known that, initially, the bank’s notes were accepted without difficulty, while
the opening of current accounts was slow and was promoted by the same
directors who encouraged the members of board to extend them through
the links of friendship (Blasco-Martel and Sudrià 2010, p. 99). In order to
enhance its reputation, the Bank of Barcelona brought together the main
businessmen of the city and built a network in which the greatest fortunes of
the moment were linked, which in turn was fed by leading or participating in
the main economic ventures (Badia-Miró et al. 2013). The Minutes of the
Bank mention the importance of its reserves as a sign of the strength of the
institution numerous times and the fact that, somehow, in the mental
representation of those who had entrusted their funds to the bank, the image
of the institution as a huge coffer full of metal persisted. In this sense, the
words that the bank used to educate its clients in the bank’s operations in
relation to banknotes, the most delicate piece of banking operations, are very
revealing. This is illustrated, for example, in the Minutes of the General
Meeting of Shareholders on several occasions (especially at the beginning) in
order to illustrate that «the only and recognised base to support the credit of
the notes is the metallic currency». They also identify the Palmer Rule as
their own: «Well-managed banks are considered in a normal state when they
have the securities of the portfolio well secured and keep in cash one-third of
their liabilities payable at sight, such as deposits, current accounts and bills
issued. This is the type of the Bank of England and the other very accredited
ones»15. The directors of the Bank of Barcelona, in establishing compliance
with the Palmer Rule, had the objective of stimulating trust in the institution
and it is for this reason that they advertised it. In reality, the concepts of
solvency and liquidity firmly overlapped at the time.
The 1847–1848 crises affected the Bank of San Fernando as well as the
Bank of Barcelona (albeit for different reasons). This crisis forced the gov-
ernment to change the regulations, and it promulgated a royal decree
(9 September 1848) that separated issuing from the rest of the institution’s
banking activities, just as the 1844 Peel Act had done with the Bank of
England. The crisis also led to the passage of the 1849 and 1851 banking laws
(Blasco-Martel 2016). The circulation of notes from the Bank of San
Fernando was limited to twenty-five million pesetas (in July 1848 that volume
had almost doubled), and Article 3 of the 1849 Banking Law stated that the
Madrid Bank had reserve requirements of its notes by keeping a third of their
15 Minutes of the General Meeting of Shareholders of the Bank of Barcelona 12 July 1846, p. 2,
and 2 February 1847, p. 2, respectively. These are not the only documents in which these aspects are
referred to. See also: 2 February 1848, p. 3; 6 August 1848, p. 3 or the one of 5 August 1849, p. 3
referring to the «exuberance of metallic in strongbox».
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value in metallic reserves, and the rest in gilt-edged securities. However, the
1849 Law did not precisely reflect Britain’s Palmer Rule, because the rest of
the bank’s current liabilities (current accounts and deposits) were not
guaranteed.
Regulators at that time tried to make the Bank of San Fernando the
country’s single bank of issue. They failed in this endeavour and settled
instead for regulating issues. In their attempt to alleviate the crisis that had
affected the Bank of San Fernando, the effects of the laws of 1849 and 1851
actually went beyond the crisis, for they limited the volume of emission to
banks’ paid-in capital. The provincial banks of Barcelona and Cádiz had to
reduce their issues accordingly, and this encouraged an increase in the
number of banks’ current accounts, which came to substitute notes in
commercial operations. The regulation thus forcibly introduced the use of
current accounts in banking business activity, in inverse proportion to the
fall of notes in circulation. This situation would continue until 1856, when
the Law of Banks of Issue liberalised the creation of banks of issue and credit
societies.
The 1856 law stipulated that new provincial banks could accept deposits
and issue notes, but the maximum volume of their emission could not exceed
three times their paid-in capital. The banks of Barcelona and Cádiz were able
to continue operating according to their existing bylaws. The wording of Article
20 of the 1856 law was very similar to that of Article 3 of the 1849 law, which
stated that a bank’s volume of emission should never exceed one-third of its
metallic reserves. During the first half of the 1860s, the Bank of Spain faced a
liquidity crisis, and for months at a time, its notes were either not convertible,
or they were exchanged for gold due to the scarcity of silver in the market.
The first provincial banks of issue in Spain (Table 1) were born in
response to traders’ need for means of payment (Blasco-Martel 2004). Their
activity encouraged the use of notes and the development of current
accounts. Both instruments, although different, are dependent on the pub-
lic’s trust. In the case of notes, emission is controlled by the banker, while
current accounts depend on the will of their customers to carry out their
financial operations in the particular bank (Bagehot 1999, pp. 68–69). This is
the difference between a deposit bank and a bank of issue. In the mid-19th
century, Spanish provincial banks were a combination of both; they created
notes and bank money through deposits. However, each bank behaved dif-
ferently, depending on the relative proportion they held of each of these types
of liability. In the Bank of Spain, for instance, current accounts during the
period from 1852 to 1874 represented an average of 23 per cent of their total
liabilities, whereas the average for provincial banks was 31 per cent.
Until 1856, notes and current accounts were used interchangeably and,
for banks of issue, a fall in the circulation of notes was immediately trans-
lated into a rise in the volume of current accounts. After 1856, banks pro-
liferated across the peninsula and significantly increased the circulation of
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banknotes in the economy. At the same time, the limitations imposed by
state regulators so that the liabilities raised by issuing banks were remun-
erated, encouraged the formation of credit societies. The creation of the Caja
General de Depósitos (a sort of National Savings Bank) in 1852 had launched
TABLE 1










Bank of Barcelona 1844 Barcelona 34 61
Bank of Cádiz 1846 Cádiz 54 84
Bank of Málaga 1856 Málaga 27 46
Bank of Sevilla 1856–
1857∗
Sevilla 29 54
Bank of Spain 1856∗∗
Bank of Santander 1857 Santander 31 102
Bank of Bilbao 1857 Vizcaya 59 159
Bank of Zaragoza 1857 Zaragoza 32 78
Bank of La Coruña 1857 La Coruña 8 29
Bank of Valladolid 1857 Valladolid 22 54
Branch of Bank of
Spain in Alicante y
Valencia
1858
Bank of Jerez de la
Frontera
1860 Cádiz 54 84
Bank of San Sebastián 1862 Guipúzcoa 20 63
Bank of Reus 1862–
1863∗
Tarragona 10 28
Bank of Burgos 1863 Burgos 5 16
Bank of Pamplona 1863 Navarra 7 17
Bank of Vitoria 1864 Álava 14 45
Bank of Tarragona 1864 Tarragona 10 28
Bank Balear 1864 Baleares 7 19
Bank of Palencia 1864 Palencia 6 15
Bank of Santiago 1864 La Coruña 8 29
Bank of Oviedo 1864 Oviedo 3 14
Notes: ∗Authorisation and opening.
∗∗Formerly Spanish Bank of San Fernando.
Italics refer to Bank of Spain and branches.
Source: Gazeta de Madrid and Bernal Lloréns and Sánchez Ballesta (2016, p. 165).
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the first interest-bearing current accounts (see Sánchez-Albornoz 1967, p. 6;
Pérez de Armiñán 1977; Gonzalo-González 1981). In 1856, Credit Societies
also started paying interest on their current accounts, which naturally led to
an increase in customers, which in turn led to a decrease in current accounts
in provincial banks. Eventually, some banks (such as the Bank of La Coruña)
also paid interest on their customers’ current accounts, but they were censured
by the government. Other banks (such as that of Jerez) were not authorised by
the state to do so, despite their expressed wishes (Bernal Lloréns and Sánchez
Ballesta 2008, p. 76; Sudrià i Triay and Blasco-Martel 2016). After the 1866
crisis, the growth of current accounts across Spain would appear to suggest
that the country had embarked on a process of modernising its use of financial
instruments (see Martín-Aceña and Pons Brías 2005). However, not all pro-
vincial banks followed this trend. Their origins as well as their operations were
heavily influenced by the region in which they had been established. Not all
had the same capacity to raise current account enrolments. They did, however,
share an extensive use of banknotes.
It has been pointed out that the regulatory system of Spain’s issuing banks
did not incorporate the Palmer Rule, but some banks did in fact apply it. It is
important to note how the provincial banking sector and the Bank of Spain
effectively used this rule. Figures 2 and 3 show the different behaviours of
these banking institutions. In Figure 2, it can be seen that the Bank of Spain
barely applied the Palmer Rule, for during almost the entire period indicated
in the Figure, its metallic reserves were below the norm declared by the Bank
of England to be an adequate reserve requirement for a bank. The explana-
tion lies in the fact that the Spanish norm only guaranteed the convertibility
of notes, and from that perspective, the institution’s reserves only fell below
its obligations during the years 1863 and 1864.
However, the Palmer Rule not only required that banks guarantee their
notes, but guarantee the obligations to their customers as well — deposits
and current accounts. Deposits were not particularly relevant in this period
but starting in the mid-1860s they became more so. Whether we take into
consideration term deposits (which can be regarded as some sort of loanable
funds), or not, the evolution of the Palmer Rule that the Bank of Spain made,
indicates that this institution used its customers’ funds for financial inter-
mediation. If this had not generated distrust among the public, it would not
have been a problem. However, the Bank of Spain had difficulties in
redeeming its notes on several occasions, as evidenced particularly in the
1860s. In addition to demand for not redeeming their notes (Pérez de Guz-
mán 1866), the bank also attracted criticism from the Congress of Deputies,
where the government was required on different occasions to force the Bank
of Spain to make cash payments of the notes16. The government, partly
16 See, for example, the Proceedings of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies of 22 May 1865, 5
February 1866 and 6 July 1866, among others.
YOLANDA BLASCO-MARTEL
154 Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History
responsible for the bank’s situation, had no way of enforcing the law. The
behaviour of the Bank of Spain is explained by the fact that in its operations,
its link with the Treasury was more important than its reputation among its
customers. In fact, its clients were confident that the link established with
national finances was, in addition to the reason for their existence, their
safeguard. This was, in fact, the case. The Bank’s business with the state
maintained its dividends above virtually all issuing banks between 1856–
1863 (Tedde de Lorca 2015, p. 133). However, these high dividends implied a
greater risk that became evident when, in the early 1860s, it had difficulties
redeeming its notes.
The behaviour of the provincial issuing banks during this period was
different. The first issuing banks had to build a reputation. The Bank of
Barcelona, one of the longest lived, understood that minimising reputational
risk had a cost: keeping a portion of its loanable funds in reserve. That is why
it assumed the Palmer Rule from the beginning of its operations. The Bank of
Barcelona’s example was followed by the other banks that appeared later.
FIGURE 2























































Coin and bullion Palmer Rule without deposits Palmer Rule with deposits
Source: Gaceta de Madrid (in millions of pesetas).
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Aggregating the data of all provincial issuing banks (except the Bank of
Spain), it can be seen in Figure 3 that the provincial banking sector behaved
quite differently. First, deposits became significant after the law of 1856. This
indicates that most provincial banks began attracting deposits intensively as
soon as they were established. Before then, the banks of Cádiz and Barcelona
had not raised significant funds using this financial instrument. This is
important because the sector’s compliance with the Palmer Rule is seen to
have been more or less constant, except for the period of 1860–1866. How-
ever, if deposits are excluded — keeping in mind that their longer maturity
explains why they were used in intermediation — the Palmer Rule was
indeed enforced during the entire period in which multiple banks could
issue notes.
Figure 3 also shows how, from 1860, there seems to have been a decision
to dissociate deposits from the Palmer Rule. Until that time, there had been
almost total alignment; however, from then on, banks appeared to keep a
third of circulation and current accounts as cash in hand, but deposits were
FIGURE 3




































































Coin and bullion Palmer rule with deposits Palmer rule without deposits
Source: Sudrià i Triay and Blasco-Martel (2016, appendix) (in millions of pesetas).
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no longer guaranteed in this way. This might be related to the increase in the
number of provincial banks, as well as their capacity to attract more
deposits, but also to the appearance of the credit societies that competed
with the issuing banks from 1856 onwards.
By the end of the 1860s, some of the banks that had been created thanks
to the 1856 Law of Banks of Issue had disappeared, as well as several credit
societies. The 1866 crisis, a projected law to build a national bank, and the
absolutely liberalising regulation that was produced after the 1868 revolu-
tion, all characterised the final years of this decade (Sánchez-Albornoz 1963;
Sánchez-Albornoz 1967; Sudrià and Navas 2007; Moro et al. 2015). The early
1870s were marked by political instability, and the financial system con-
tinued operating under the previous laws until a royal decree, passed in 1874,
brought the period of multiple banks of issue to an end (although further
legal instruments had to be enacted in order to secure its application). This
decree configured the monopoly of emission to favour the Bank of Spain, and
it ended the stage of plurality of issuing institutions. During these years the
Bank of Spain had many difficulties. The bankruptcy of Overend and Gurney
was, in a way, providential to the institution which survived despite its
performance, which was certainly weak in those years (Moro et al. 2015, pp.
188–192).
The end of the plurality of issuing was a response to the government’s
need to face the expenses derived from various military conflicts (the Carlist
war and the first uprising for the independence of Cuba). Between 1870
and 1873 the Spanish government had leased the Almadén mines to the
Rothschild house and, subsequently, it had sold the Riotinto mines to obtain
liquidity. However, the situation was unsustainable, and the government was
finding it increasingly difficult to obtain credit abroad and could not increase
fiscal pressure domestically. The agreement of 1874 with the Bank of Spain
was born of necessity; the government obtained an advance of 125 million
pesetas from the Bank of Spain in exchange for the decree that made it the
only issuer in the country.
4. NOTES AND CONVERTIBILITY, 1874–1921
The royal decree of 19 March 1874 finally awarded the Bank of Spain the
monopoly of emissions that it had longed for. The simply stated norm
emphasised two critical elements: the only banknotes that could circulate
throughout the country were those issued by the Bank of Spain, and
consequently the banknotes of issuing banks were illegal. According to
Galvarriato, the 1874 law was the first to impose duty on the Bank of Spain’s
capital, thinking of its eventual emission. The previous laws had established
the amount of capital purely by guesswork. According to this author, the
circulation of notes in the 10-year period between 1874 and 1883 doubled
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thanks to the establishment of branches. In the next 5-year period (1884–
1889), it doubled again (Galvarriato 1932, p. 102). The Bank of Spain had a
dual task ahead: to give its banknotes credibility, which was not easy after
the hits that these notes had taken during the previous decade; and to extend
its notes across the entire peninsula. The Bank achieved this thanks to a
network of franchises, and in cities that had banks of issue its notes were
readily accepted17.
The volume of circulation took a giant leap with the 1884 unification of
banknotes. The issue of 1 October 1886 was the first to be characterised by a
note for all the Spanish provinces; in 1889, this emission was expanded
(Tortella Casares 2008, p. 343). With the promulgation of the Commercial
Code of 1885, the state «attempted to conciliate the liberal spirit of the time
with a regulation that favoured banking intermediation» (Zunzunegui 1992,
p. 126), but it failed. The new code allowed for the potential creation of
future banks of emission and set out regulations for them, stating, however,
that they could not be established until after the monopoly awarded to the
Bank of Spain had expired18. The 1885 code also effectively incorporated
reserve requirements vis-à-vis these future banks’ responsibilities for custo-
mer funds. It stated that banks should «keep reserves in their vaults for a
quarter, at least, of the total value of their metallic deposits and current
accounts, as well as of circulating banknotes» (article 180). This was the first
time that the Spanish regulatory system integrated the Palmer Rule, even
though it was a hypothetical regulation, since it only affected banks that
could be established once the present monopoly expired. The Bank of Spain
was exempt from compliance with this rule19.
The period comprising the decades of the 1880s and 1890s is char-
acterised, then, by an increase in the demand for notes. The Bank of Spain
was not always capable of responding to this demand. During the early
1890s, the scarcity of banknotes made itself felt in many cities, among them,
Barcelona, whose bank’s Shareholders Meeting, in accordance with the
regulation established by the aforementioned Commercial Code, voted in
favour of requesting the government to award it a license to issue notes
again20. Finally, the Law of 14 July 1891 revealed just how closely the Bank
of Spain and the Spanish Treasury collaborated with each other. This law
doubled the bank’s issuing capacity to 1,500 million pesetas, ending the
17 See Castañeda (2001, pp. 47, 65). Note that the Bank of Spain programmed all of its first
franchises for provinces in which banks of issue had existed. See Sudrià i Triay and Blasco-Martel
(2016).
18 See art. 123 and section 8 of the1885 Commercial Code. In fact, the Bank of Spain never
established reserve requirements for its clients’ deposits or accounts. This surprised observers from
the Bank of England. See Bank of England Archive, file OV61/25.
19 See art. 566, 1885 Commercial Code.
20 Minutes of Governing Board of the Banco de Barcelona, 28 July 1890. However, this was not
pursued further, for the bank had to focus its efforts on addressing the effects of the 1890 inter-
national crisis.
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relationship between the bank’s capital and its emissions, and tying emis-
sions to metallic reserves (the bank was supposed to keep a third of circu-
lation as metallic reserves, and at least half of those reserves had to be gold
bullion). The law also extended the Bank’s monopoly of issues until 1921,
and allowed treasury debt to be counted as a current asset, thus laying the
foundations for the monetisation of the deficit (Martín-Aceña et al. 2013).
How did current account enrolments and deposits evolve after the Bank
of Spain was given a monopoly of emissions? Its monopoly on issuing notes
had turned the Bank of Spain into a «national» bank (Castañeda 2001), and
therefore its main objective was to provide the national economy with means
of payment; however, the Bank of Spain still competed with the commercial
banking sector21. Until 1900, it held nearly 60 per cent of Spain’s overall
savings. After that, the tables were turned, so that by 1910 it was the private
banks that held 60 per cent of the country’s savings and current accounts22.
The Law of 1874 had dedicated several articles to regulating the matter of
banknote emission, clearly considering that this was the Bank of Spain’s key
function. If one is to judge the Bank’s effectiveness in carrying out this
mission, the constant complaints about the lack of money throughout the
peninsula suggest that it was not entirely successful. It is very likely that the
restrictions imposed on issues by tying them to the Bank’s capital are what
caused this shortage. This capital had been raised to 150 million pesetas in
1882, so that emissions represented ten times the Bank of Spain’s capital.
Thus, in just two decades, the Madrid Bank had increased tenfold the ratio
maintained by banks of issue between their capital and their emissions. For
its part, in those two decades the Bank of Spain had met two important
goals: extending its branch network nationally, and extending the use of the
note (Tortella Casares 1970). Moreover, the Bank of Spain’s profits grew
during the first 25 years of its emissions monopoly. In a law dated 14 July
1891, the Bank was required to hold one-third of the actual circulation, half
in gold and half in silver. However, given the depreciation of silver and the
fact that gold did not leave the Bank’s coffers, convertibility was suspended
de facto.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the Bank of Spain’s metallic reserves after
it gained monopoly of issue. Until the early 1880s the convertibility rule
(expressed in the chart as the Palmer Rule) had been more than complied
with. However, from then until the years immediately following the Villaverde
reform, non-compliance with the convertibility rule was systematic.
It is a fact that by the end of the 19th century, the Bank of Spain only
converted notes into depreciated silver. Thus, some authors have pointed out
21 Competition between banks linked to governments and commercial banks in other countries
is pointed out by Goodhart (1988, p. 9).
22 The data provided by Tedde de Lorca and Tortella Casares (1974) indicate that in 1875
commercial banks had 33 per cent of deposits and current accounts; in 1880, it was 34 per cent; in
1890, only 22 per cent; while it rose to 36 per cent in 1900 and to 60 per cent in 1910.
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that Spain had a de facto silver standard (Gay de Montellá 1953; Tortella
Casares and García Ruiz 2013, p. 87). Others have questioned the very
convertibility of the Spanish monetary system. Serrano argues that con-
vertibility was the keystone of the gold standard system, and since convert-
ibility in Spain was never fully assured, the country could not establish a
commitment to gold (Serrano 2004, p. 21). Ródenas and Bru (2006, p. 559)
indicate that, after the Figuerola Decree of 1868, Spain had a bimetallic
standard and that convertibility was guaranteed by law. A more recent work
by Martinez-Ruiz and Nogués-Marco (2014, pp. 19, 37) argues that from the
1880s, Spain had di jure bimetallism, but a de facto fiat system, and that the
pretense of convertibility to gold came to an end in the 1890s. The credibility
and reputation of central banks has changed over time. One of the factors
that affected their reputation was the ability of these institutions to remain in
the gold standard system (Bordo and Siklos 2016, p. 107). Spain never truly
adopted the gold standard, and many historians argue that a major reason
behind this was the difficulty encountered by the Bank of Spain in guaran-
teeing convertibility.
FIGURE 4
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Source: Tedde de Lorca and Tortella Casares (1974) (in millions of pesetas).
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The banking law of 1921, along with the 1931 law, regulated the Spanish
financial system until the end of the Civil War. The 1921 law established a
maximum level of emissions of 5,000 million pesetas, but it authorised the
government to increase that level to 6,000 million if necessary. The law also
stipulated that fiduciary circulation, up to 4,000 million pesetas, be backed by
40 per cent in gold, and from that amount the gold coverage was 60 per cent.
Martín-Aceña argues that Minister Cambó preferred the «theory of con-
vertibility» to the «theory of responsibility», and that meant not adopting any
decisions regarding monetary policy. In fact, it was evident throughout this
period that the Bank of Spain operated as a private bank with a preferential
relationship with the state. Thanks to this its shareholders reaped great
profits, despite the evident problem the bank’s dual function represented for
the country’s financial system. The Bank of Spain could not assume a role as
a monetary authority (Martín-Aceña 1984, p. 34) precisely because its pri-
mary responsibility was to its shareholders. Having failed to create a national
bank that would address the common good in its monetary decisions, the
Spanish government interfered with the financial institution by proceeding
to enact monetary policies itself. Thus, the law of 1921 took some power
away from the Bank of Spain, while allowing the limit of emissions to be:
«discretionally altered by the Government, acting solely in accordance
with state interests, as had occurred in the past, and since the rule of
metallic reserves was ineffective insofar as the country did not adopt
the gold standard, one cannot say that the law identified effective
criteria to regulate the money supply. Given that the real bills doctrine
did not provide operative criteria either, one must acknowledge that
the 1921 banking code simply ignored this key feature of monetary
control» (Martín-Aceña 1984, p. 28).
5. CONCLUSION
Spanish banks, founded with close ties to the state and its needs, did not
incorporate the convertibility of reserve requirements for their notes into
their charters until provincial issuing banks were established. Even then,
regulations only mandated that circulating notes be guaranteed by a metallic
reserve equal to at least one-third of the total amount of such notes. This
meant that customers’ funds (current accounts and deposits) were not
guaranteed by legislation or bank regulations. However, some provincial
banks adopted stricter norms to regulate their own operations, such as the
Palmer Rule; the first was the Bank of Barcelona, which voluntarily complied
with the Palmer Rule to safeguard its operations adequately. The provincial
banks of issue established after 1856, followed suit, and adopted at least part
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of the Palmer Rule, sometimes excluding term deposits from their guaran-
teed obligations. The Bank of Spain, with close ties to the state, barely
complied with the Palmer Rule during the period when there were multiple
banks of issue.
The differentiated behaviour of the provincial issuing banks was a
response to their need to send a signal to their customers about their sol-
vency. To build a reputation they adopted the Palmer Rule in its original
version. Most provincial banks created in the period, with the notable
exceptions of those of Valladolid and Sevilla, kept healthy balance sheets and
were able to redeem their banknotes. It was the provincial banking sector
that encouraged the extension and use of notes in the Spanish economy. It
was also provincial banks that encouraged people to open current accounts
and deposit their savings, because these institutions were physically located
in customers’ communities. Their administrators were known to the popu-
lation, and usually enjoyed respectable reputations. The increase in paper
money was therefore accomplished thanks to these financial institutions
administering their cash vaults soundly, thus offering clients a sense of
security. Certain institutions’ commitments to large metallic reserves
responded less to prudence than to the growth of their current account
enrolments. These deposits made banks’ coffers robust, which in turn
favoured the introduction and extension of notes in economic exchanges.
Thanks to the trust that provincial banks’ notes generated, when the Bank of
Spain was awarded the monopoly of issue in 1874, the single note issued by
this privileged institution was almost universally accepted in those cities that
had previously had a bank of issue.
Convertibility was never truly addressed in the origins of the banking
institutions associated with the state. However, after the arrival of provincial
banks of issue and the various crises associated with the Bank of Spain’s
convertibility, the latter opted for a bullionist model, in which notes were
convertible according to a bimetallic standard. However, the bank’s regula-
tions allowed for this convertibility to be guaranteed with clients’ deposits
and current accounts, and not with shareholders’ capital. Because of their
proximity to their customers, or because they did not have the type of gov-
ernment backing the Bank of Spain enjoyed, provincial banks operated
under an entirely different logic, even though there was no law preventing
them from acting in the same way as the Bank of Spain. These banks had to
build their reputation by sending signals to customers about their solvency
and their ability to maintain the convertibility of their notes. When these
banks were liquidated as institutions of issue in 1874, the convertibility of
notes was left to an institution that was neither accustomed to, nor prepared
to practise it. This allowed abnormal behaviour on the part of the Bank of
Spain when it began to act alone. One of these anomalies is the rule, men-
tioned by the historiography but without empirical evidence, regarding the
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end of the convertibility of notes into gold, which took place «de facto» in the
1890s, although «de jure» the Bank continued to be obliged to respect it.
The goal of this work has been to analyse the causes and effects of the
banking requirements and practices regarding metal reserves in the accep-
tance of banknotes in Spain. The provincial banks adopted the Palmer rule as
an indicator of the soundness of their operations. The effects of this practice
favoured the extension of banknotes in large parts of the country. The Bank
of Spain did not need to disable so many funds in cash, given their rela-
tionship of mutual dependency with the Treasury. It did not need to dis-
cipline itself because its link with the Treasury offered it a high profitability
at the cost of assuming important risks. The effect of this behaviour was
manifested in the practical impossibility of entering the Gold Standard, due
to the difficulty of the Bank in guaranteeing the convertibility of its notes.
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